TERRORISM: A GROWING THREAT

Since 1993, a new trend of terrorism emerged which was not territorially bound as those in the North-east or Kashmir. This distinctive wave of terrorism targeted Indian cities with the political goal of discrediting India’s economic growth by creating disorder. This urban terrorism is a growing threat and needs special emphasis since India’s urban population will grow over there with massive migration from rural to urban areas in search of better livelihood. Terrorism result in the creation of an atmosphere of fear, and cause civilian deaths in order to coerce a government to succumb to a particular political demand by the terrorist group. Any terrorist activity reflects the tactical-goal of intimidating the target population in order to achieve the strategic purpose of coercing the government representing that population into certain political concessions. The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”. Most significant cause is a perceived sense of injustice by the aggrieved group, and a belief by that group that the use of violence will bring about a change. Thereby, most terrorist groups use their political ends for justifying violent means.

  

The Rise of Terrorism in India

Most prominent has been terrorism in Kashmir which begun in the 1980s. This terrorism is believed to have been mostly fuelled by Pakistan in order to separate the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley from India. According to the US Department of State, three foreign terrorist groups are active in Kashmir, namely, the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), and the Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT). All the three groups were formed in the 1980s and 1990s. The hand of Pakistan in fuelling the Jihad in Kashmir to create an environment of either Azadi (freedom) or joining Pakistan is evident. During the Afghan Jihad in the 1980’s against the Soviet Union, Pakistan trained 80,000 Mujahideen in training camps established in Pakistan. Once the Afghan jihad was over with the end of the cold war and Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan turned its attention on India. Terrorism in Kashmir exists due to the ability of outfits like LeT and HuM to operate from Pakistan. The hand of Pakistan in fuelling home grown terror groups like Indian Mujahideen (IM) is also suspected especially through the LeT proxy. It was the IM that claimed responsibility for most of the terror attacks on Indian cities in 2008. The year 2008 also witnessed multiple bomb blasts in Assam in October of that year and the 26/11 terror attacks. The worst terror attack in 2008 was however the Mumbai terror attacks which spread across three horrific days (62 hours), from 26-28November. Though comparisons with 9/11 were too farfetched, the surprise element in these attacks was the willingness of the terror outfit to engage the Indian security forces in a frontal battle. Earlier terror-attacks had involved simultaneous bomb blasts in crowded market-places and official complexes. In Mumbai, the seizure of its five star-hotels and Nariman house and attacks on its main railway station by the terrorists involved a direct engagement by the terrorists with the security forces. The entry to Mumbai was dramatic: the Gateway of India route. It appears that all the terrorists were well trained in marine man oeuvre and a special course known as Daura-e-Shaifa in specialized raids into hotels and hospitals by its cells was imparted to them at the training stage. The terror cell mostly used the GPS to reach Mumbai through the sea on November 26, landing at Badhwar Park in Cuffe Parade and then split up into four batches targeting Chhattrapati Shivaji Terminus, Oberoi Trident Hotel, Taj Hotel, Leopold Café, and Nariman House from around 2130hr in the night. Ironically, their objective to get global attention through these terror attacks was perhaps a “mission accomplished”with the kind of Indian national media frenzy that followed the attacks.

 

Strategies of Terrorism

Five strategic logics and goals of terrorist outfits. Strategic logics include attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and outbidding. Terrorists utilizing attrition advertise to their adversary their ability to impose considerable costs on the target population over a period of time; intimidation is mainly aimed at coercing the target population to support the terrorists’ cause; provocation attempts to induce the adversary to respond to terrorist acts with indiscriminate counterforce resulting in enormous hardship for the local population. Consequently, the population ends up supporting the terrorist outfits. Spoiling includes attempts by terrorist outfits to undermine any move against terror by moderates amongst the target population. Outbidding

aims at convincing the target population that one terror outfit is more credible than others. Five principle goals are meant to be achieved by these strategic logics: regime change, policy change, territorial change,social control of the population, and status quo maintenance of an existing regime or territorial arrangement.

The terror bombings in India were either for “territorial change” or “social control”. The LeT’s involvement in the Mumbai blasts was motivated by its goal of territorial change in Kashmir by incorporating it with Pakistan. SIMI and the Indian Mujahideen were more geared towards social control as they wanted to strengthen their own status amongst their present recruits as well as the target population.

Use of Internet as a Strategic Tool

The use of the internet for raising money, propagate terror ideology and engineer recruitment is another significant aspect of modern day terrorism. The internet is widely used for purposes of propaganda, recruitment, information, and intelligence. It has become like a virtual sanctuary for cell based terrorism which is not territorially bound like the al Qaeda. Terror handbooks, videos, and propaganda are uploaded into the internet for wide dissemination and publicity. Websites carry the message of terror groups to a wider audience and generate funds and recruits to their cause. Terrorists are also increasingly using the internet chat rooms to “share information, coordinate attacks, spread propaganda, raise funds, and recruit. Hacking of websites and carrying out virus attacks are some of the other cyber terror tactics. Hacking into security systems is another form of terror attack. The use of the internet serves the purpose of terrorist groups because they operate in small cells and are not based in a single geographical area. Hence, for operational planning, the internet, satellite and mobile-phones are being used extensively. This easy communication through the internet brings in the transnational character of terrorism. Terrorists can be anywhere and yet stay wired using technology. Even during attacks, the leader of a particular terror attack can give instructions via satellite phone. During the Mumbai attacks in 2008, the 10 LeT men broke up into small teams and were in touch with each other through the cell phone devices like Blackberries. They used the Global Positioning System (GPS) to steer their boat towards Mumbai. During the attacks at the Taj Hotel, the terrorists were continuously being instructed via satellite phone by their Pakistan based controllers. As seen by the Mumbai attacks, it is also easier for the Pakistani based terror groups to spread their radical ideologies, make financial transfers as well as coordinate small cells in India through the internet. This is an aspect that would need to be grappled with and recognized as the next big challenge for the counter-terror forces in India. Besides this, there is another motive of terrorists using cyber. Terrorists aim to target critical infrastructure like transportation networks, banking and finance, fuel production, military complexes, etc. In achieving this end, the terrorists use Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Cyber attacks are also low cost as malicious software is easily available on the internet, and the added anonymity of the attacks creates a low risk situation.

Deterring Terrorism

India’s counter-terrorism strategy requires well-coordinated, specialized units with superior intelligence gathering and assessment skills. The government must also urgently activate effective counter measures like law-enforcement, covert operations based on sound intelligence against terror networks, and efficient bureaucratic coordination. The greatest successes against terror are planned attacks averted by state forces. This needs greater media coverage so that a sense of security is instilled amongst citizens.

Institutional Challenges

Instead of addressing these security challenges, the reality in cities like Delhi and Mumbai is that most of the best trained police personnel are utilized for VIP security. The living conditions of most police personnel are suboptimal they are made to work in conditions where even basic amenities are absent. Also, the ratio of police personnel at the level of constables in Delhi is much lower than the mid-level ASIs, there by coming in the way of a visible police presence on the ground. National Security Guard (NSG) is an elite counter-terror force but it is designed to serve only as a rapid reaction force and not a preventive force.

Sophisticated Counter-Terror Technology

One of the effective means that can deter terrorism in civilian spaces is the installation of Closed Circuit Television cameras (CCTV) in public places. This could provide images on suspicious activities. CCTV can also prove useful to avert terrorism as most terror outfits carry out reconnaissance of a likely target area before the actual attack. Deterring terrorism is, however, not an impossible task. Contrary to what the press might want us to believe, terrorists are not irrational actors. Though terror outfits might lack specified “return address”, focused intelligence can find out elements in a “terror network”, which may not be motivated enough to “carry through” a plan of attack if the risks involved are too high. Deterrence against terror outfits can also work if the decision making within the terror outfit is influenced by some “cost-benefit” calculations. Thereby, holding at risk the political goals of an outfit could be the best effort at countering these groups. If states can make tracking the financiers of the terror network a priority, then there is good enough chance of averting terror strikes. States sponsors of terrorism like Pakistan for instance can be more effectively deterred by bringing about diplomatic pressure from countries like the US as well as by skillfully “utilizing the tool of coercive-diplomacy” on the part of India. To be credible, however, coercive-diplomacy must be backed by the threat of military action but not actual action per se as that could lead more to instability than stability. The calculus of “probability of success” in military actions must also be carefully assessed. Significantly, terrorism must also be looked upon as a process, or a series of actions culminating in violence rather than a single act or event as the 9/11 attacks signify. The need of the hour is to also think in terms of a well-coordinated anti-terror force at the national level, perhaps something similar to the National Security Guards or “special forces” since the adversary is well coordinated and spread out across the states in a seamless web of small cellular units. India should establish a Federal Counter-Terrorism Mechanism, which will integrate the various intelligence agencies, state-police, customs, border security, cyber and public health departments to counter terror attacks. Terror prevention by security forces is, however, not enough. Civil society organizations especially representing the minority communities also need to be tapped into by the state in order to assuage the insecurities felt by these communities because of the illegal activities of a few amongst them. Indian national media also needs to be more objective in their news reporting and refrain from jumping to conclusions about who is a terrorist unless the guilt is proved in a court of law. The starting point is to deny terrorists the ability to fund, train and plan such attacks. Once that can be achieved, the terrorists will find very limited room for man oeuvre to carry through their deadly attacks. 

Source via - thehindu.com/‎

economictimes.indiatimes.com/‎